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On May 19, 2009, Minister of Housing M. Yusuf As'yari (2004—09) hosted the 
second National Congress of Housing and Settlement (Kongres Nasional Perumahan 
Rakyat II) at the Hotel Bidakara, Jakarta.2 Attended by some fifteen hundred people 
from various parts of Indonesia, the Second Congress is considered a milestone in the 
history of Indonesian housing and promised "a new era" for Indonesian housing and 
settlement.3 While looking ahead, the Second Congress also made a connection with 
the very first congress on housing, which was held more than half a century earlier, in 
1950, when the newly independent country was feeling its way through decolonization 
and trying to provide housing for its population, the rakyat. The 2009 congress closed 
with a declaration that:
11 am indebted to Suryono Herlambang for sharing his thoughts, stories, and concerns about housing 
policy and urbanization in Jakarta, many of which I have used in parts of this paper. I thank Jo Santoso 
and Kemal Taruc for the ongoing discussion from which I keep learning. A longer Indonesian-language 
version of this paper will come out as a book with their critical commentaries. I also thank Ben Abel for his 
friendship and generosity during a period of library research. Michael Leaf and two anonymous reviewers 
offered insightful comments, which have helped me to see more clearly the complexity of the subject 
matter, its historical context, and current dilemmas. Whatever merits this essay may have are due, in large 
measure, to those individuals' contributions and helpfulness, but none of them is responsible for the views 
or potential errors, or oversights, this paper may contain. I also acknowledge the support of the Major 
Collaborative Research Initiatives (MCRI), led by Pitman Potter, at the Institute of Asian Research, 
University of British Columbia. Finally, this paper is dedicated to the memory of Wastu Pragantha Zhong 
(1935-2011), a caring friend, dedicated teacher, and compassionate public servant of Jakarta.
2 "Kongres Perumahan dan Pemukiman II tahun 2009," Inforum 1 (2010): 11-13.
3 "Pembangunan Perumahan Rakyat Memasuki Era Baru," Inforum 1 (2010): 6-9.
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We, participants of the National Congress of Housing and Settlement II, 2009, are 
heirs of the 1950 Congress of People's Housing, which declared housing as the 
responsibility of the state. We feel responsible to implement the 1945 Constitution 
(Undang Undang Dasar, UUD 45) and the Human Rights Law (Undang Undang 
tentang HAM), which declare that everyone has the right to live well, materially 
and spiritually, and to settle in a house with a good and healthy environment.4
The official publication of the Ministry of Housing, Inforum, also started its report 
on the 2009 Congress with a quotation from Mohammad Hatta, the first vice president 
of Indonesia, who opened the 1950 Congress on Healthy Housing for People (Kongres 
Perumahan Rakjat Sehat), where the term perumahan rakyat (people's housing) was 
perhaps first coined by the newly independent state. "Indeed, our goal [to provide 
housing for everyone] won't be realized in two years. It won't be fully completed in ten 
or twenty years. However, in forty years or in half a century, we will be able to fulfill 
our wish, if we are committed and make the effort with confidence."5 The optimism 
demonstrated in 1950 to provide housing for everyone within fifty years inspired those 
attending the 2009 Congress to keep the housing mission going.
The symbolic reference to the early years of independence by participants in the 
2009 Congress seems to turn a blind eye on Suharto's New Order regime (1966-98), 
during which era a series of national workshops (known as lokakarya nasional) on 
housing were periodically held. By evoking the notion of kongres (rather than lokakarya), 
the 2009 meeting set up an identity of its own, one that reconnects its mission to that of 
the 1950s, while dissociating itself from the housing policy of the New Order.6 The 
break with the recent past seems ironic, for most of the order of things today could be 
said to have been already shaped during the Suharto years. The claim to have initiated 
a new era may be ironic, but it is not entirely bogus. The post-Suharto era is, indeed, 
different from what preceded it. The notion of rakyat, at least, is easily mobilized today 
to fashion the new era, so, with the 2009 Congress, one might imagine a shift in the 
strategy to provide housing for the poor.
Several new initiatives, indeed, were proclaimed by the Second Congress, some of 
which are clearly a departure from those of the New Order. For instance, housing is 
now considered a human right, rather than simply a human need for shelter, as was 
assumed by the New Order.7 Oswar Mungkasa, from the National Planning Board
4 Architect Suhadi Hadiwinoto posted this declaration on his blog on June 4, 2009, http:/ /suhadi. 
hadivvinoto.org/2009/06/04/deklarasi-kongres-nasional-perumahan-dan-permukiman-ii/, accessed 
January 10, 2012.
5 "Pembangunan Perumahan Rakyat Memasuki Era Baru," Inforum.
6 For a recent summary of housing policy in twentieth-century Indonesia, see Johan Silas, "Perjalanan 
panjang perumahan Indonesia dalam dan sekitar abad XX," in Kota Lama, Kota Baru: Sejarah Kota-Kota di 
Indonesia Sebelum dan Setelah Kemerdekaan, ed. Freek Colombijn, Martine Barwegen, Purnawan Basundoro, 
and Johny Alfian Khusyairi (Yogyakarta: Ombak Press, 2005), pp. 3-29; and Lana Winayanti, ed., Kilas 
Balik Perumahan Rakyat, 1900-2000 (Jakarta: Kementerian Perumahan Rakyat dan Pusat Dokumentasi 
Arsitektur, 2010). For a comprehensive account of colonial and early postcolonial housing policies and 
practices, see Freek Colombijn, Under Construction: The Politics o f Urban Space and Housing during the 
Decolonization o f Indonesia, 1830-1960 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011). For a description of the housing market 
and policy implications during the Suharto era, see Raymond J. Struyk, Michael L. Hoffman, and Harold 
M. Katsura, The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities (Washington DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1990).
7 Oswar Mungkasa, "Sekilas tentang Perumahan sebagai Hak Asasi Manusia," Inforum 1 (2010): 20-23.
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(Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional-Bappenas), explains in his 
contribution to Inforum that the UUD 1945 already contained the principle of a right to 
housing for everyone, but it needs to be more specific in its formulation.8 9According to 
Mungkasa, the meaning of hak rumah tinggal (the right to live in a house) as stipulated 
in the 1945 constitution can be extended to give a sense of hak perumahan (the right to 
housing). Such broadening of the meaning would allow Indonesia to conform to 
chapter 11 of the UN's International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, which 
defines the right to housing as comprising these elements: "security of tenure, 
availability of services, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location, and cultural 
adequacy."4 Mungkasa ends his article by reminding local governments, following the 
mandate of decentralization, that they are now responsible for enacting the principle of 
human rights by taking the lead to solve the problem of settlement for impoverished 
urban populations.10
Another major outcome of the Second Congress concerns the shift of power in 
urban management. The congress stated that state and private developers will no 
longer solely dictate policy and decisions regarding where and what sort of housing is 
built. Instead, the local or city government (pemerintah daerah—pemda) and its residents 
are now expected to play a dominant role in the development of housing, which would 
include finding solutions to the issues of housing the poor and the disadvantaged. 
(Indeed, in the post-Suharto era, the goal of housing the poor fits with people's 
expectations of a democratic government.) The mission to create a pro-poor housing 
policy could be said to stem from the democratic transformation that has changed the 
nature of state-society relations. The new democratic era, which continues to open up 
opportunities for private developers to shape the city, has broadened the space in 
which city officials and residents (largely members of the upper-middle class) may 
define the kind of city they want. The congress was clearly shaped by both internal and 
external forces.11 It was guided by the spirit of decentralization in Indonesian politics, 
but it was also shaped by trends in international urban management. Adopting those 
frameworks involved making commitments to ecologically sustainable urban 
development and to the practice of "good governance." Institutions related to housing 
are expected to be accountable, transparent, and responsive to the needs of the public.12
With the new era's mission to house rakyat, the allusion to the 1950 congress could 
not be more strategic. In the 1950s, perumahan rakyat was one of the few discourses 
available to independent Indonesia to establish political legitimacy, largely because the
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 23.
10 Ibid.
11 The Second Congress follows the World Bank's strategy of "enablement" in urban development. 
According to this doctrine, human capacity can best be advanced within an environment that supports 
freedom to participate in free markets with minimum intervention from the state. For a discussion of 
"enabling," see Gareth A. Jones and Peter M. Ward, "The World Bank's 'New' Urban Management 
Programme: Paradigm Shift or Policy Continuity?" Habitat International 18,3 (1994): 33-51. For a regional 
assessment pertinent to housing, see Emma Porio, "Rethinking the Enabling Strategy in Social Housing: 
State-Civil Society Dynamics in Southeast Asia," in Governance on the Ground: Innovations and 
Discontinuities in Cities o f the Developing World, ed. Patricia L. McCarney and Richard E. Stren (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 171-93.
12 "Kongres Perumahan dan Pemukiman II tahun 2009," Inforum 1 (2010): 11-13.
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Dutch colonial government had lacked the political will to remedy deplorable housing 
conditions for the poor.13 In his comprehensive study of housing during the late 
colonial and early independence periods, Freek Colombijn indicates that, towards the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, the colonial administration, after years of neglect, 
was supportive of pro-poor housing initiatives, but Dutch leaders nevertheless 
remained reluctant to make significant commitments to public housing. In Colombijn's 
words, the colonial state "never intended to bear the brunt of the costs of housing."14 
As a colonial "liberal" state, the government sought to externalize the cost of public 
housing for Indonesians via private investments in the market. The reluctance of the 
colonial state to provide public housing is reflected in the failure of two major 
government agencies—N.V. Volkshuisvesting (Public Housing Corporation Ltd., 
established in 1925) and Gementelijke Woningbedrijven (Municipal Housing 
Authority)—to supply adequate housing (and what was built did not reach the poor). 
In a nutshell, Colombijn concludes, "colonial public housing was too expensive for the 
lower incomes, too small to make much impact, and of a design that was impractical 
for the lower incomes."15
As indicated above, soon after the transfer of power in 1950, an independent 
Indonesia held the Kongres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat—itself an offshoot from previous 
meetings organized by the Japanese colonial administration.16 The congress produced 
recommendations, and some actions, but, more importantly, it ignited enthusiasm 
from nationalist elites to turn perumahan rakyat into a primary concern of the newly 
independent nation. 17 The Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat (People's Housing 
Department) was set up in 1951 to produce and finance housing for the low-income 
population (rakjat djelata).18 However, the housing shortage remained an acute problem, 
and it soon overwhelmed the new government. In the end, the state had to appeal to 
people to continue to help themselves with their own housing needs.19
Today, Hatta's speech is recalled to motivate contemporary leaders to fulfill the 
state's commitment. Yet, while the enthusiasm of the 1950s can be retrieved, it would 
be unrealistic today to expect a return to the socialist ethic that advocates providing 
affordable housing for all after years of Suharto's New Order market revolution. 
Instead, a kind of pro-poor market manipulation is used, with the state regulating the 
private sector in order to achieve the social goal of housing the poor. The state seeks to 
moderate neo-liberal tendencies by housing the poor through public means, even 
though, following the World Bank paradigm, the state is not expected to build or
13 See Colombijn, Under Construction; and James Cobban, "Public Housing in Colonial Indonesia, 1900- 
1940," in Modern Asian Studies 27,4 (1993): 871-96. For a broader view, see Richard Harris, "Housing Policy 
for the Colonial City: The British and Dutch Experience Compared, 1901-1949," Urban Geography 30,8 
(2009): 815-37.
14 Colombijn, Under Construction, p. 329.
15 Freek Colombijn, "Public Housing in Post-colonial Indonesia: The Revolution of Rising Expectations," 
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde 167,4, (2011): 441.
16 For the Japanese-Indonesian discussion on housing, see Colombijn, Under Construction, pp. 279-81.
17 For a discussion on the 1950 Kongres Perumahan Rakyat Sehat, see ibid., pp. 336-39.
18 For the performance of Djawatan Peroemahan Rakjat, see ibid., pp. 341—44.
19 Ibid., pp. 207-24.
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subsidize low-cost housing using state funds.20 The "new era" seeks to eliminate state 
subsidies for housing and to replace the subsidies with an investment scheme that 
would generate funding for low-income-family housing. The allusion to pernmahan 
rakyat thus is not without real economic interest. The targeting of perumahan rakyat, as I 
will show in this paper, justifies for the first time the wholesale incorporation of vast, 
informal housing settlements into the formal housing market. In this sense, while the 
congress declares the emergence of city government and citizenry as the "players" in 
the broad process of urban change, it means the city is expected to create a good 
investment climate for financial markets to operate in the low-cost-housing industry. 
'The new era" proclaimed by the ministry of housing is therefore a clear departure 
from the times of Sukarno and Suharto, but there are continuities in terms of economic 
expansion, political interest, and urban renewal, all now conducted under conditions 
shaped by the declared goal of housing the rakyat.21
The new era cannot just be announced. It has to be created. The main task of this 
paper is, therefore, to tease out the several measures used by the state and local 
government to enable investment in low-cost housing. These include the regularization 
of a land tenure system, the dissolution of informal land markets, allocation of space 
for low-cost housing, and selection of a population group based on creditworthiness. 
These measures are clearly steps toward urban renewal, with an emphasis on 
satisfying the call for citizens' right to shelter and, by so doing, eradicating the need for 
informal occupation of lands. Such measures, however, are not only technical and 
managerial, they are also social and political, as they entail a displacement of informal 
and irregular workers (who are unable to prove to banks that they are creditworthy) to 
the fringes of the city.
The first part of this essay, "The Contexts," identifies how current issues of housing 
the poor are similar to and differ from those that faced the governments of previous 
eras. It teases out a shift in the strategy of providing housing in response to the state's 
fiscal crisis and the concomitant neoliberal democratic transformation that produces a 
new way of financing perumahan rakyat in the post-Suharto era. The second part, "The 
Discourse," identifies the contours of the new housing programs for perumahan rakyat 
to show how the financing works. It looks at a financial scheme for low-income 
housing called Fasilitas Likuiditas Pembiayaan Perumahan (FLPP, Liquidity Facility for 
Housing Finance) and its practice of land certification as a manifestation of the
20 One wonders whether the decentralized Indonesian state fits with David Harvey's definition of a 
neoliberal state, the mission of which is to "create and preserve an institutional framework [in order to] 
secure private property rights and guarantee[s], by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets ... If 
markets do not exist, then they must be created by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the 
state should not venture." David Harvey, A Brief History ofNeoliberalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), p. 2.
21 For a discussion of the shift in Indonesian urban planning and management, see Robert Cowherd, 
"Planning or Cultural Construction? The Transformation of Jakarta in the Late Soeharto Period," in The 
Indonesian Town Revisited, ed. Peter Nas (Singapore: ISEAS and Lit Verlag, 2002), pp. 17—40; Tommy 
Firman, "Indonesian Cities in the Early Reform Era," in The Indonesian Town Revisited, ed. Peter Nas, pp. 
101-12; Delik Hudalah and Johan Woltjer, "Spatial Planning System in Transitional Indonesia," 
International Planning Studies 12,3 (2007): 291-303; Christopher Silver, "Do the Donors Have it Right? 
Decentralization and Changing Local Governance in Indonesia," The Annals o f  Regional Science 37,3 (2003): 
421-34; Nico Schulte Nordholt, "New Forms of Urban Infrastructural Development Policy in Indonesia: A 
Critical Look at Public-Private Partnership," in Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia, ed. 
Peter Nas (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995), pp. 193-208.
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mainstream economist idea of "formalizing the informal." The dissolution of the 
dualism of formal and informal markets, this paper suggests, entails the dislocation of 
the informal and further marginalization of the urban poor. The third part, 'The 
Practice," spatializes as well as temporalizes the practice of providing housing for the 
poor by looking at Jakarta's short-lived "1,000 Towers" program, which was initiated 
in 2006 as the first post-Suharto low-cost apartment project. I explore how this 
subsidized housing program came to an end (in 2010) and describe the subsequent 
creation of the FLPP. I also expose how the 1,000 Towers project was appropriated by 
developers as a means of acquiring scarce urban land and promoting their own 
middle-class housing projects. I then provide an interpretation of spatial politics by 
showing how the program of perumahan rakyat has been tied to the gentrification of 
space in Jakarta. The last part, "Utopia?," projects the future of urban Jakarta based on 
the discourses and practices discussed in the preceding parts. It uses a wishful- 
thinking book called Jakarta: 500 Years, by Zaenuddin HM,22 a senior journalist from 
Jakarta, to show how his imagined urban form and social spirit of Jakarta in 2027 could 
be seen as an enactment of the urban renewal of Jakarta today. By way of conclusion, I 
turn to the socio-political effects of a gentrified Jakarta on its surrounding areas.
This essay, as a whole, shows the spatial implications of urban renewal and 
population control and how the program of perumahan rakyat is implicated in people's 
exclusion and dislocation from the gentrified city. The paper thus is not just about 
housing and its current policy. Instead, it is about the production of space by way of a 
housing strategy to accommodate the poor. With a focus on the strategies of governing 
elites in Jakarta and the primary research materials limited to metropolitan media 
sources, the account that emerges is certainly not the whole story. Incomplete as the 
account is, however, it nevertheless attempts to link housing studies with the spatial 
politics of a built environment. Finally, while this essay is critical of current housing 
policies and projects a gloomy urban future, I acknowledge the importance of housing 
the poor and the genuine efforts made by the actors involved, both in practice and in 
their sincere, utopian impulses.
PART I: The Contexts
Market Expansion and the Dissolution of Land's Dualism
In February 2009, a few months before the Housing Congress convened, Minister of 
Housing M. Yusuf As'yari met with Sri Mulyani (then minister of finance) and 
Boediono (then governor of the Bank of Indonesia) and signed an agreement to work 
together to package housing loans backed by bank deposits owned by the perumahan 
rakyat into a bundle of marketable mortgage-backed securities that would be sold on 
the stock market.23 The arrangement was part of the state's attempts to find a new 
source of capital to finance perumahan rakyat. Harnessing the financial market was 
considered necessary for, according to Minister As'yari, "We need fifteen triliun rupiah
22 Zaenuddin HM, Jakarta 500 Tahtm: Obsesi dan Harapan tentang Jakarta pada Tahtm 2027 (Ultah Jakarta ke 
500) [Jakarta: 500 Years—Obsessions and Aspirations of Jakarta in 2027 (Jakarta's 500th Birthday)] (Jakarta: 
Java Media, 2008).
23 Aditya Suharmoko, "Indonesia Determined To Develop Secondary Mortgage Market," Jakarta Post, 
February 13, 2009.
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[US$1.5 billion] but the total subsidy for low-cost apartments is only 2.5 triliun rupiah 
[US$250 million]"24 The assumption was that by selling mortgage-backed securities to 
investors, the capital accumulated by banks alone would be sufficient to finance the 
construction of housing and, therefore, the government would no longer need to 
subsidize it. Sri Mulyani favored this strategy, too, for the sale of the financial package 
"will help people obtain capital from banks, and developers, too, will profit from the 
increase of home buyers."25 Meanwhile, Boediono promised that the Bank of Indonesia 
would keep an eye on the quality of the securitization products—mortgage-based 
securities, collateralized debt obligations, and their related instruments—to comfort 
investors.26 Such a move to use asset securitization in support of perumahan rakyat was 
considered "revolutionary," as for the first time in the history of Indonesian housing 
the state took a concrete step to eliminate forever, it is hoped, subsidies for low- and 
modest-income housing.
Sri Mulyani and Boediono are known as mainstream professional economists who 
believe in the power of formal market mechanisms to generate urban productivity.27 
They follow the World Bank's paradigm, according to which the state is expected to 
play the role of creating the conditions that will improve the housing markets of 
Indonesian cities. They are also aware that the key condition for asset securitization is 
the availability of a land market. However, in Indonesia, as in other developing 
countries, there is more than one type of market operating in society. The informal 
land market (defined in full on the next page), for instance, constitutes a large portion 
of the overall land market, but an informal land market cannot be securitized unless it 
is formalized. Thus, the state is expected to maximize the functioning of land markets 
by incorporating informal land markets into the formal one. Such an integration will, it 
is hoped, enhance urban and national productivity and ensure the proper functioning 
of the market itself. Low-income housing is a strategic target for informal-to-formal 
conversion, since the majority of modest and low-income populations still rely on the 
informal land market for their shelter. Before we discuss the arguments in favor of 
dissolving the informal land market, we need to understand the politics of land 
dualism in urban Indonesia.
Legal Dualism of Land in a Historical Perspective
The dualistic terms "formal" and "informal" refer to the differentiation between 
registered and unregistered lands.28 In principle, under the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) 
of 1960, which establishes the "right of control by the state," all lands must (eventually)
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 See William Liddle, "Tawaran Budiono," Tempo, January 8, 2006, p. 50.
28 The following account is based on the insightful study of Michael Leaf on land rights in Indonesia; see 
Michael Leaf, "Legal Authority in an Extralegal Setting: The Case of Land Rights in Jakarta, Indonesia," 
Journal o f Planning Education and Research 14 (1994): 12-18; and Michael Leaf, "Land Rights for Residential 
Development in Jakarta, Indonesia: The Colonial Roots of Contemporary Urban Dualism," International 
Journal o f Urban and Regional Research 17 (1993): 477-91. See also D. Fitzpatrick, "Beyond Dualism: Land 
Acquisition and Law in Indonesia," in Indonesia, Law, and Society, ed. T. Lindsey (Sydney: The Federation 
Press, 1999), pp. 74-96.
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be registered with what is today called the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan 
Nasional, BPN).29 However, in practice, the majority of Jakarta's land (estimated to be 
70 percent in the mid-1990s; more recent data is unavailable) remains "unregistered" 
with BPN, even though some of that land may be "registered" at local municipal 
administrative offices (known as kelurahan; today, Jakarta has as many as 265 of these 
offices).30 An individual's ownership of informally registered land, called a land right 
claim, is based on letters, receipts, and documents issued by kelurahan offices and 
witnessed by kelurahan officials. This kind of land right claim is legal, but it is not 
recognized as legitimate by the BPN. The difference between formally registered land 
(with the BPN) and informally registered land (with the kelurahan) has significant 
symbolic and material consequences affecting how the city is understood. As Michael 
Leaf points out, "the kampung lands, which contain the city's extensive popular 
settlements, are virtually all unregistered [in the eyes of BPN], while those of the 
formal sector—exclusive neighborhoods of developers' built housing—make up the 
bulk of the registered residential parcels."31
These categories and the legal dualism embedded in them are, no doubt, 
"inherited" from colonial discourse of land tenure. The delicacies of these categories 
have been explored by Freek Colombijn,32 and it is sufficient here to note that the 
categories were constructed to secure a formal land market (known as European title) 
while leaving everything else partially and, should we say, "informally" codified.33 The 
latter includes indigenous land rights (titles) that could be bought and sold "without 
any formalities or concomitant administrative costs."34 In this way, we can say, the
29 See B. Harsono, Hukurn Agraria Indonesia: Himpunan Peraturan-peratumn Hokum Tanah, Ninth Edition 
(Jakarta: Djambatan Publishers, 1989), pp. 5-6.
30 According to Raymond Struyk, Michael Hoffman, and Harold Katsura, "the formal housing sector," 
defined using measures of housing quality and tenure security, included 31 percent of dwelling units in 
urban Indonesia. Jakarta has the lowest share of units meeting the definition, 23 percent. See: Struyk et al., 
The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities, p. 351. The formal housing sector refers to houses built on lands 
registered under BPN. This sector is largely controlled by private developers and the state housing agency, 
Perumnas.
31 Michael Leaf, "Legal Authority in an Extralegal Setting," p. 15. The Indonesian colloquial term for the 
physical and social dualism is the contrast between "gedong and "kampung," which has led to the different 
characterization of people's behaviors in terms of "gedongan and kampungan."
32 Colombijn, Under Construction, pp. 141-80.
33 The term "informal" is, in fact, insufficient to capture the wide range of categories by which the land in 
the colony is divided and ruled. The colonial pluralism of land rights was a nightmare for town planner 
Thomas Karsten, who wrote in his report in 1920:
The Indies town presents us an unsurpassed variegation from the point of view of land rights: 
there is what is often a practically inextricable jumble of Native land rights [in some cases still 
limited by the communal rights of the village], ownership in fee simple, hereditary tenure on 
municipally owned land, rights to own dwellings on, or temporarily occupy, government-owned 
lands, "private estates" [some of them still encumbered with Native usaha rights], lands not 
registered as having an owner and hence belonging to the government (whether or not occupied 
illegally, rented, or placed under the administration of some public authority), "unknown lands" 
(whose present owner is not known, sometimes occupied and sometimes not), here and there 
"'agrarian ownership," and rights of utilization, as well as residence under adat law on land 
belonging to another (menumpang), and "Batavia land lease."
Thomas Karsten, "Town Development in the Indies," in The Indonesian Town: Studies in Urban Sociology, ed. 
W. F. Wertheim (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1958), p. 55.
34 Colombijn, Under Construction, p. 147.
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colonial state externalized the cost of providing low-income housing and the headache 
of administrating it by creating a relatively autonomous, informal domain in which the 
Indonesian population could be expected to handle their own housing situation. In this 
informal realm, people built dwellings for themselves. As indicated above, the 
independent Indonesian state in the 1950s sought to overcome this colonial construct 
of dualism, but failed and was forced to appeal to the people to build for themselves 
via mutual help (gotong royong). What this means is that the postcolonial state had no 
choice except to reinstall the colonial-style formal and informal dualism that it had 
sought to transcend.1"
Formal and informal dualism persisted throughout Suharto's New Order in the 
form of land registered with the BPN and land registered with the kelurahan (but not 
with the BPN). This separation also produced separate markets, which ultimately 
consolidated the notions of "formally" and "informally" registered land. These 
categories, like their colonial predecessors, however, are not static, since, as Leaf points 
out, "the unregistered category is officially regarded as transitional—parcels of land do 
pass from the informal, unregistered market to the market for registered land."30 
However, for the low-income population, there are all kinds of advantages to wanting 
informally registered land (or "unregistered land" in BPN's parlance) to stay that way 
because owners of such properties are not required to follow the various regulatory 
and often costly standards for building construction and use. In Leafs words, "by 
staying outside of the formal system, owners of unregistered parcels are able to avoid 
many of these controls—including subdivision requirements, minimal lot sizes, 
building setback regulations, and the need for construction permits—which may 
significantly raise the costs of building development."35 67 So, when the World Bank 
launches its mission to "formalize informal lands," it is basically trying to resolve the 
dualism of formal and informal by registering with the BPN the vast informally 
registered lands. The issue, however, is not just about securing owners' rights under 
national law, but also the removal of kampung (the popular settlements on informally 
registered land in urban areas), as they are at odds with the manifold regulations that 
govern formal land use and building codes in the city.
For economists such as Sri Mulyani and Boediono, the resolution of the dualism of 
formal and informal means full legal recognition of landownership, a condition that is
35 In 1961, the state, via Minister of Social Housing Muljadi Djojomartono, issued a booklet, "Perumahan 
Gotong-Rojong" (translated in the original as "Self-help and Mutual-aid Housing"), which stated: "In the 
context of the Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berentjana (Planned National Overall Development) and 
its realization in the field of housing, it is necessary to stimulate and maintain the spirit and vigor of 
gotong-rojong [mutual aid] still existing in the village community. Hence, the Department of Social Welfare 
via the Office of Housing Welfare feels itself responsible to give guidance, information, and material 
assistance in order to provide technical know-how to the Village Social Committee as to how to build 
healthy houses on the basis of gotong-rojong; in this way, the aspirations of the Government will be 
materialized, i.e., that every family should have its own house, which though simple in construction, can 
meet the motto: 'a healthy house, strong people' [rumah sehat, rakjat kuat\. I express the hope that this spirit 
of mutual aid ... still flourishing in its purest form in the village would spread out and would stimulate 
the urban areas as well though probably manifested in another form or style, so that with the spirit of 
gotong-rojong a satisfactory state of welfare will cover the whole country." See Kantor Kesedjahteraan 
dalam Perumahan, Perumahan Gotong-Rojong, Departemen Kesedjahteraan Sosial (1961), pp. 47-48.
36 Leaf, "Legal Authority in an Extralegal Setting," p. 15.
37 Ibid.
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essential for the securitization of housing. By resolving the dualism, so the story goes, 
modest-and low-income citizens' mortgages in perumahan rakyat would emerge as 
marketable assets in the secondary financial market. In short, for the economists, 
resolving the dualism will resolve the financial challenge of providing housing for the 
poor.35 *8 In this scenario, the aggregated, not-insignificant savings of low-income 
households could be packaged as an investment to generate the capital necessary for 
funding the perumahan rakyat in the long run. This well-intended mission to produce a 
sustainable capital flow for the production of low-income housing, however, relies on 
speculative financial capitalism. How the government planned to harness this volatile, 
speculative market to benefit low-income housing is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but, as this essay will show, this financial mechanism produced a series of measures 
with substantial spatial consequences for the urban poor who had been relying on the 
informal urban land market for their survival.
Politics of Land's Dualism
To understand why and how land market dualism has survived, first we need to 
recognize that the link between low-income housing and the urban and national 
economy has only recently been understood and appreciated.39 In the past, especially 
under Sukarno, perumahan rakyat was fundamentally a socialist ethic essential to the 
socio-political well-being of the nation, but it was never considered to be a driver of 
economic productivity. Under Suharto, while the connection between upper-middle- 
class housing and urban productivity was firmly established, housing for the low- 
income population was considered a responsibility of the state and associated with 
subsidies. Nevertheless, the government's investment in perumahan rakyat throughout 
the New Order was significantly lower than that of neighboring countries, and while 
this shortcoming may well be attributed to a variety of causes, the following two are 
particularly important.
First, as pointed out above, the large pool of land unregistered with BPN is land 
that accommodates low-income housing. In this instance, the occupation of such land 
by low-income individuals is not the same as squatting, since the state tacitly "permits" 
individuals to occupy unregistered land, and, furthermore, because the informal land 
must be registered in kelurahan, even though it remains unregistered with the BPN. The 
Washington, DC-based consultants Hasfarm Dian Konsultan and the Urban Institute 
reported to the Indonesian Ministry of Housing in 1990 that "much of the problem 
with squatting and other forms of very insecure tenure has been avoided in Indonesia 
because of the flexible land law system, which permits a variety of levels of land rights 
and corresponding degrees of tenure security."40
351 am grateful to Michael Leaf for his suggestion that I use the phrase "resolving the dualism" instead of
"formalizing the informal" to capture the complexity of Indonesian land rights.
39 For a discussion of economic turns in housing policy from a global historical perspective, see: Godwin
Arku and Richard Harris, "Housing as a Tool of Economic Development since 1929," International Journal
o f Urban and Regional Research 29,4 (2005): 895-915; and Richard Harris and Godwin Arku, "The Rise of 
Housing in International Development: The Effects of Economic Discourse," Habitat International 31 (2007): 
1- 11.
40 Raymond J. Struyk et al., The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities, p. 362.
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The informal occupation of land is institutional, with its own set of rules. It is 
largely a collective action involving local officers, brokers, and land mafiosi who sell 
the rights for persons to settle on any unregistered land. Such informal trading of 
rights to land involves various degrees of legality, often in the form of titles. While this 
system exhibits chaos, it is essential to providing low-income housing. Without this 
informal housing sector, there was just no way for the national government to meet the 
demand for housing. The state's relative neglect of public housing is due to the large 
share of housing production taking place in the informal sector. In other words, "self- 
regulated" informal housing has helped the state externalize the cost of providing low- 
cost housing.
Second, the government of the New Order era allowed informal land to be 
occupied by the poor because the occupiers provided the low-cost labor needed to 
develop the rest of the city.41 We could say that the state's tolerance of informal land 
occupation is a form of "in-kind subsidy" for the urban poor to motivate them to stay 
in the city so that they could serve the needs of the formal urban economies. This 
outcome may well be an unintended consequence, for the government did not design 
the informal sector. The state, however, is fully aware of the benefit of keeping the 
informal sector alive. For instance, in 1991, Soetjipto Wirosardjono, in his capacity as 
deputy chairman of the Central Bureau of Statistics, explained how vendors (pedagang 
kaki lima) who sell inexpensive food have allowed "the industrialists and the business 
sector to pay such a low salary to the (formal) workers ... without the informal sector, 
workers would simply be unable to survive on the level of salary they are receiving."42 
The very existence of these vendors and low-paid workers relies on the availability of 
popular housing produced informally, even though the city government allegedly 
abhors such settlements. However, it should be clear that the informally occupied land 
of these vendors and workers remains uncertified, and it therefore may not be used by 
the occupants as collateral for loans or to protect them from eviction.
For mainstream economists, this kind of informal land system distorts the 
operation of the free market. Tolerated or undisturbed for decades, the informal land 
market has become today a new target of financial capital.43 The large pool of informal 
settlements constitutes an immense concentration of resources, such as undeveloped 
land and aggregated savings, which could, it is hoped, be incorporated into the formal 
market for the revitalization of the national economy.44 Today, the call has been
41 Kartini Sjahrir, Pasar Tenaga Kerja Indonesia: Kasus Sektor Konstruksi (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1995). See also 
Prisma 51 (1991), special issue, "The Cities of Janus," for debates concerning the informal sector in urban 
Indonesia.
42 Soetjipto Wirosardjono, "The Informal Sector: Victims of a Double Standard," Prisma 51 (1991): 61.
43 Such a view is promoted by Hernando de Soto in The Mystery o f Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the 
West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000). See a critique by Timothy Mitchell, "The 
Properties of Markets," in Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity o f Economics, ed. Donald 
MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 244-75.
44 Formalizing informal settlements is not a new idea. The "Kampung Improvement Project," which 
started in 1969, could be seen as just such an effort, as it helped to regularize the legal status of popular 
settlements and homeownership, but the scale of that project is small. For a recent assessment of 
Indonesia's "Kampung Improvement Project," see Jan Bredenoord and Paul van Lindert, "Pro-poor 
Housing Policies: Rethinking the Potential of Assisted Self-Help Housing," Habitat International 34,3 (2010): 
278-87; Devisari Tunas and Andrea Peresthu, "The Self-Help Housing in Indonesia: The Only Option for 
the Poor?" Habitat International 34,3 (2010): 315-22; and Florian Steinberg, "People's Participation and Self-
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sounded to capitalize the vast majority of land in the city that is informally regulated, 
and this proposed development comes on the back of perumahan rakyat.
Crisis and Before
The current move to eradicate informal settlements and to register land is not fully 
an invention of the post-Suharto era. In the 1990s (when private developers grasped 
the opportunities to exploit the growth of an upper-middle-class urban population via 
real estate housing), the New Order government was already involved in finding 
alternatives to subsidizing low-cost housing. Experts from the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank were then involved in considering the potential of secondary 
mortgage finance.45 467Several seminars hosted by the Indonesian government were held 
in 1993, and by 1995, with support from the Asia Development Bank, the Ministry of 
Finance had already drafted a framework for the establishment of secondary mortgage 
facilities.45 The monetary crisis of 1997, however, delayed the plan's implementation, 
and the idea was only revived in 2003, five years after the collapse of Suharto's regime. 
In 2003, a committee was formed to draft plans for a secondary mortgage market. A 
presidential decree (no. 19/2005) was soon issued initiating the end of subsidies and 
the beginning of a new era that embraced the secondary mortgage market as the 
engine for producing capital for financing low-income housing.4 The securitization of 
perumahan rakyat shows the continuity of the capitalist project in the post-Suharto era, 
which now targets modest and low- income households.
It must be noted, however, that the 2005 presidential decree was propelled by the 
monetary crisis in 1997, and it was formed in the chaotic time of political transition. 
During the crisis, with both monetary and manufacturing sectors in deep trouble, and, 
along with the decline of the price of oil, there was basically nothing to spare from the 
state budget, especially for subsidizing low-cost housing—an item that had always 
been at the margin of state funding. As the state budget was forced to rely on loans 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it became apparent that subsidies were 
frowned upon. After the 1997 crisis and as part of the IMF agreement, the Bank of 
Indonesia stopped funding housing subsidies. In 2001, Properti Indonesia, a real estate 
magazine, reported that, since the fall of Suharto, funds for subsidizing low-cost 
housing were missing for two years from the State Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan
Help in the Indonesian Kampung," in Beyond Self-Help Housing, ed. Kosta Mathey (London: Mansell, 1992), 
pp. 353-76.
45 Michael J. Lea and Robert Blanchard, "Indonesian Secondary Mortgage Facility Study," prepared for the 
Ministry of Finance, Government of Indonesia, and supported by Research Triangle Institute and the US 
Agency for International Development, July 1994, http: / / www.smf-indonesia.co.id/ uploads/ pdf/ 
referensi/Michael_1994.pdf, accessed August 29, 2012. See also Michael Lee, "The Evolution of Housing 
Finance in Indonesia: Initiative Responses to Opportunities," Habitat International 20,4 (1996): 583-94.
46 Michael J. Lea, Alex J. Pollock, and Jay K. Rosengard, "The Creation of a Secondary Mortgage Facility in 
Indonesia," Housing Finance International, September 1 (1997), pp. 24-29, www.housingfinance.org/ 
uploads/Publicationsmanager/9709_Indo.pdf, accessed June 19, 2012.
47 Sasmaya Tuhuleley, "Secondary Mortgage Market Development," June 6, 2010, 
www.kampoengpenulis.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=167:secondary- 
mortgage-market-development&catid=60:property&Itemid=81, accessed September 28, 2011.
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Belanja Negara, APBN).48The reason for the disappearance of this particular budget 
item has never been clear, but Properti Indonesia believes that the neglect is due to "the 
all-out attention of the government to solving the crisis in the banking sector."49
In the time of financial crisis and the structural adjustment undertaken according to 
the IMF's terms, mainstream economists seized the opportunity to act. For instance, in 
the early 2000s, Properti Indonesia published opinions from economists and planners 
and outlined the basic problem of housing. "All this time, housing developers rely on 
banks for loans. As a result, when the bank stops its credit flow to the property sector, 
developers are in big trouble. They have no money to build and there is no longer any 
generous bank to turn to."50 With many banks declaring bankruptcy, a new source of 
funding was sought. It was at this moment of despair over the "monetary crisis" 
(krismon) that suggestions emerged recommending that the housing industry should 
now "make use of financial and stock markets," especially given the strategic plan 
from the Ministry of Housing that "in the next five years, the financing of housing will 
be integrated with the stock market."51 In 2001, Syafruddin Arsyad Temenggung, the 
deputy coordinator for Foreign Economic Cooperation, urged that "we shouldn't lose 
the momentum ... The moment of crisis is the right time ... to build a financial system 
for housing."52 Temenggung, a graduate of Cornell University's department of City 
and Regional Planning, put forward a financing model for housing based on the US 
mortgage system. What Indonesia really needed, according to Temenggung, was a 
financial institution capable of packaging mortgage loans and selling them to investors 
in the stock market. The market would in turn produce the capital banks needed to 
provide long-term loans with a low interest rates to home buyers. Since the success of 
this scheme relies on selling securities to investors, Tumenggung proposed that this 
investment system be handled by brokers, because "they know how to establish 
obligations and attract investors so that money can circulate." "3
On February 7, 2005, President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who had just been 
elected, signed Presidential Decree no. 19/2005.54 The new president had already made 
low-cost housing part of his 100-day program, and thus the venture into the secondary 
financial markets became a priority. The presidential decree produced PT Sarana 
Multigriya, a state-owned financial institution whose mandate was to establish the 
secondary mortgage market.55 Headed by Erica Soeroto, a housing financier, PT Sarana 
Multigriya moved fast, and Soeroto urged developers and banks, as well as the Jakarta
48 For a report on the "disappearance" of housing subsidies from the state budget in the early post-Suharto 
era and the subsequent discussion about reforming housing finance, see "Menunggu Manuver Erna," 
Properti Indonesia 1082 (November 2000), pp. 9-18; and Yuniar Susanto, Tutut Handayani, and Hilda 
Hastuti, "Amburadul Sistim Pembiayaan Rumah," Properti Indonesia 1086 (March 2001): 16-23, 29-30.
t9 Yuniar Susanto, Tutut Handayani, and Hilda Hastuti, "Lingkaran Setan Subsidi KPR," Properti Indonesia 
1086 (March 2001): 21.
50 "Obligasi OK, Gandeng Asing Lebih OK," Properti Indonesia 1082 (November 2000): 15.
51 Ibid.
52 Syafrudding Arsyad Temenggung, "Kita Jangan Sampai Kehilangan Momentum," Properti Indonesia 
1086 (March 2001): 24.
53 Ibid.
51 Tuhuleley, "Secondary Mortgage Market Development."
55 Ibid.
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Stock Exchange, to work together to create a financial machine. "If every component 
works together, then the business wheel will turn. The faster the selling of the housing 
asset, the bigger the volume, and the faster the interest rate of the loan will go down."50 *6 
Quick sell is the key to the success of this operation, she advised.
The post-Suharto innovation in the field of housing thus is the harnessing of 
financial capital to finance perumahan rakyat. The city, the nation, and investors are all 
involved. They will have access to the combined savings of low-income households;57 
the city, in its quest for capital investment, will benefit from regularization of 
landownership and eradication of irregular settlements; and the nation-state will be 
able to reinforce the legitimacy of its rule through a pro-poor housing program even as 
the program relies on the speculative and volatile nature of financial capitalism. The 
effort to harness capitalist projects for the benefit of the poor, however, is not 
straightforward, because the packaging of mortgage-backed securities requires several 
conditions. First, the land (and its irregular settlement) has to be regularized and 
registered, which means resolving the formal and informal dualism discussed above. 
Second, the supply of and demand for housing has to be high (to keep prices 
affordable), as this would be an indicator for investors of the marketability of low- 
income housing. Third, buyers need to prove creditworthiness to satisfy mortgage 
obligations, even though this requirement may not be a big concern of investors in the 
secondary financial circuit, for those investors will quickly resell the mortgages after 
buying the package. The condition of creditworthiness, as I will discuss below, will not 
be met by workers in the informal sector, whose jobs and incomes are relatively 
unstable and unpredictable. Thus, the new housing program is by definition 
exclusionary, as it is intended primarily for citizens who work in the formal sectors.
In February 2009, three months before the Second National Congress on Housing 
and Settlement, the government (represented by ministers of finance and housing) and 
the governor of the Bank Indonesia jointly launched a program of selling mortgage- 
backed securities as the backbone for financing modest- and low-cost housing. Prior to 
stepping down as minister of housing, M. Yusuf Asy'ari expressed his optimism that 
the new housing scheme would be successful because "so many [modest- to low- 
income] Indonesians still do not have a house."58 The scheme, known eventually as
50 As cited in "SMM Terwujud, Bisnis Perumahan Lancar," Properti Indonesia 1082 (November 2000), p. 14. 
Erica Soeroto suggests that (contrary to Michael Lea and Robert Blanchard's secondary mortgage facility
study, noted above) a secondary mortgage market (SMM) can be established without first creating
secondary mortgage facilities (SMF). Soeroto believes that only SMM can resolve the banking problem.
Once a market is created, investors will come in along with the capital. This short cut also ignores the
suggestion of the 2002 World Bank-supported study by HOMI (Housing Market Indonesia), which
recommended that "while access to funds from long-term investors should be facilitated, either directly or
through the establishment of SMF ..., a Secondary Mortgage Market would currently not be feasible nor 
desirable in Indonesia." HOMI nevertheless suggests that "efforts could continue to facilitate off-balance- 
sheet funding, including securitization, in the future." See Marja C. Hoek-Smit, "Implementing 
Indonesia's New Housing Policy—The Way Forward: Findings and Recommendations of the Technical 
Assistance Project, 'Policy Development for Enabling the Housing Market to Work in Indonesia,"' p. 3, 
http: / / housingfinance.wharton.upenn.edu/Documents/ Indonesia%20Housing%20Policy%20Study— 
Executive%20Summary.pdf, accessed June 10, 2010.
57 For a discussion of the securitization of mortgages, see Saskia Sassen, "When Local Housing Becomes an 
Electronic Instrument: The Global Circulation of Mortgages—A Research Note," International Journal o f 
Urban and Regional Research 33,2 (2009): 411-26.
58 Suharmoko, "Indonesia Determined to Develop Secondary Mortgage Market."
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Fasilitas Likuiditas Pembiayaan Perumahan (Liquidity Facility for Housing Finance, FLPP 
hereafter), was put into practice by M. Yusuf Asy'ari's successor, Suharso Monoarfa.
PART II: The Discourse 
FLPP and Its Limit
"The year 2010 is the most dynamic year for the property industry," Koran Jakarta 
reported in its end-of-the-year evaluation of housing policy, and noted, "many new 
programs were issued which will change the future of property business."59 6012The most 
important new program was the FLPP. After a year of hard work, the new minister of 
housing, Suharso Monoarfa, who was appointed in 2009,150 launched FLPP on October 1, 
2010, the day the state commemorated its Hari Kesaktian Pancasila (Sacred Day of 
Pancasila). Monoarfa did not hesitate to call the FLPP scheme, "a revolution in the 
history of housing finance in Indonesia,"51 even though the struggle to implement 
FLPP was just beginning.
FLPP is an arrangement whereby the secondary financial market can invest in 
perumahan rakyatP2 FLPP is designed to bring down the interest rate of housing loans, a 
condition it is hoped will increase the demand for housing, especially from the low- 
income population. As indicated above, the state-owned financial institution PT Sarana 
Multigriya Finansial invited banks to participate in mortgage-based securities.63 Ideally, 
sales of the securities would provide sufficient funds for banks to give low-interest 
loans to modest- and low-income home buyers. This incentive would increase 
demands for low-cost housing, which in turn would strengthen the marketability of 
mortgage-based securities in the stock market.
To start the program, the state allocated 2.68 triliun rupiah (US$268 million) from its 
2010 APBN to invest in FLPP. With this investment, "in ten years time," Monoarfa 
projected, "the government will no longer need to provide a budget for housing since 
this start-up fund and the investment thereafter will accumulate enough capital to 
continuously supply funds for the subsequent housing loans."64 This temporal 
investment was matched by an investment in space with a particular focus on major 
cities, especially Jakarta and its surrounding "Bodetabek" (Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, 
and Bekasi). A metropolitan press reported:
The Ministry of Housing has designated Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, 
Bekasi, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Semarang as having areas for experimentation
59 "Aturan tambah, Target Meleset," Koran Jakarta, December 31, 2010, p. 16.
60 Minister of Housing Suharso Monoarfa, citing personal reasons, resigned on October 19, 2011, days 
before the cabinet-reshuffling announcement. He was replaced by Djan Faridz. Since this paper was 
written during the period of Suharso Monoarfa's tenure, and the housing policy of the new minister is 
still unclear, I use the present tense in describing Monoarfa's policy.
61 "Menpera Suharso Monoarfa: FLPP Dijamin Lebih Tepat Sasaran," Koran Jakarta, September 27, 2010,
p. 16.
62 "SMF Dorong Multifinance MasukFLPP," Investor Daily 9 Februari 2011, www.smf-indonesia.co.id/ 
index.php?mib=news.detail&id=42, accessed September 26, 2011.
63 Adi Wikanto and Christine N. Novita, "Peminat Transaksi Aset KPR Masih Minim," kontan, June 4, 2011.
64 "Menpera Suharso Monoarfa," Koran Jakarta.
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with programs for low-cost housing [the price of which ranges from five to ten 
juta rupiah (US$500-1,000) per unit] and for modest cost housing [from twenty to 
twenty-five juta rupiah per unit (US$2,000-2,500)]. The programs will be 
facilitated by a loan with an interest rate from 5.0 to 6.24 percent for 15 years. 
With this program, the monthly mortgage payment will only be around 160 to 
220 thousand rupiah [US$16-22] per month.65
Such a program, which focuses on generating demand, however, needs to be 
supported by several actors in the housing industry, especially those dealing with the 
supply side, such as the local/city government (pemda), which would be responsible to 
provide land, and developers who will design and build the housing. Irman A. 
Zahirrudin, director of Bank Tabungan Nasional (BTN), which has expanded its 
banking service via FLPP, said that "the supply of FLPP needs to be supported by the 
housing supply. This has been a major challenge for FLPP. We are ready to fund 
120,000 houses through FLPP."66 67Since the launch of FLPP, the Ministry of Housing has 
been pressing pemda and developers to speed up the process of building houses and 
apartments for low-income populations. Such urgent calls, however, do not always 
receive an immediate response, for both developers and pemda have been accustomed 
to believing that the unprofitable low-cost housing project is the responsibility of the 
state. Furthermore, the scarcity of land in the city and the desire of the municipality to 
build a business-oriented "service city" are factors that are at odds with the program of 
accommodating low-cost housing in the city. In 2006, Governor Fauzi Bowo made it 
clear to the central government that there is "no room for cheap apartments" in Jakarta 
(see part III). Still, toward the end of 2009, the Indonesian parliament (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) issued a bylaw on housing that urges "both pemda and the 
state to provide a budget that is large enough to support the housing program."n/
While pemda and the Ministry of Housing have their different aspirations and 
challenges, at least they agree on two aspects, both of which are related to the politics 
of urban space. First, both the city and the nation aspire to reduce the size of kawasan 
kumuh (decrepit neighborhoods) in the city as part of their commitment to the UN 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Kawasan kumuh literally means "run-down" 
area, but in Monoarfa's understanding, it refers to a space where "the quality of the 
infrastructure is low or deteriorating due to the increased number of people occupying 
the area illegally."68 Monoarfa equates illegality with kawasan kumuh, for he believes 
that people only upgrade their own built environment if they dwell in formal housing. 
The key to solving illegality and kawasan kumuh is gentrification. While every irregular 
settlement could be given formal legal title and property registration, not all of them fit 
the criteria of a habitable settlement. Those that lack infrastructure services and are 
shabby due to overpopulation will need to be upgraded. And when this takes place, 
the higher cost of living in the gentrified environment will force the poor to move
65 "Berharap pada Rumah Murah," Koran Jakarta, May 12, 2011, p. 9.
66 "Konsumen Masih Andalkan KPR," Koran Jakarta, May 16, 2011, p. 16.
67 "Aturan Tambah, Target Meleset," Koran Jakarta.
68 Suharso Monoarfa, "Lebih dekat dengan Menteri Negara Perumahan Rakyat Suharso Monoarfa," 
Inforum 1 (2010): 17.
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away. Monoarfa expects that, by 2019, the areas of kawasan kumnh can be reduced so 
that "30 percent of Indonesian cities are free of slums."69
Second, both the minister of housing and governor of Jakarta agree that there is 
little a place like Jakarta can do to increase the amount of land available for low-cost 
housing. In the words of Monoarfa, "it is impossible to build housing for the low- 
income population in Jakarta."70The challenge of finding space cannot be separated 
from the question of who has the right to live in Jakarta's limited space. Converting 
kawasan kumuh to formal housing favors those who have the financial capacity to stay, 
and thus the goal of providing low-cost accommodations demands a framework for 
selecting who gets in and who is left out of the housing program. Ironically, perumahan 
rakyat operates as a device for evicting some of the urban poor (especially informal 
workers, as described later).
FLPP is designed to encourage modest- to low-income households to invest their 
savings in the financial market. It therefore targets only that population with a 
relatively stable income, and those who hold a taxpayer's number (nomor pokok wajib 
pajak, NPWP) and annual income report (surat pemberitahuan tahunan, SPT).71 723While this 
class of card-carrying citizens (i.e., workers in the formal sector) constitutes a large 
pool of potential home buyers, they are by no means the only low-income workers in 
the city who need housing. Co-existing with the formal working class is an even larger 
number of self-employed workers in the informal sector. Setyo Maharso, the chairman 
of Real Estate Indonesia (REI), points out that the current scheme of FLPP should also 
accommodate "informal workers, such as street vendors [tukang bakso] and food stall 
operators [warteg dan lain-lain] who are not eligible to receive credit from banks ... 
[because] they do not understand (and are unable to produce) a taxpayer number and 
an annual income report.'"2 Maharso criticizes the FLPP scheme for excluding informal 
workers, such as vendors, even though they also "have the right to own a house."1 
Maharso suggests that the scope of FLPP be expanded to include informal workers and 
thus to broaden the market for formal housing. However, there is no way for the bank 
to underwrite what it considers as that sector's unpredictable income and uncertain 
employment.
The changing working and living conditions of the informal workers could not 
possibly be accommodated by the formal financial institutions, and these workers' 
unstable incomes could not constitute marketable mortgage-backed securities. The 
informal workers are therefore excluded from the FLPP, but they cannot escape its 
effects. As many of the informal workers live on land regulated through informal 
means, they are subject to eviction to make space for the formal low-cost housing 
program. It is unfortunate that accommodating one class of low-income workers 
demands an eviction of another class of urban poor. Ineligible for FLPP, workers from
69 "2019, Indonesia Targetkan 30% Kota Tanpa Permukiman Kumuh," Inforum 1 (2010): 28.
70 "Suharso Monoarfa: Resmi Jabat Menpera 2009-2014," Inforum 1 (2010): 15.
71 The minister of housing argues that "with SPT, there is no way to lie about income. If one lies, one is 
violating the law and there is a punishment for that." "Menpera Suharso Monoarfa," Koran Jakarta.
72 "Menanti Renovasi Insentif Pajak," Koran Jakarta, December 17, 2010, p. 16.
73 Ibid.
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the informal sector constitute a "floating population" that does not have the right to 
housing.
Land Certification
FLPP operates as part of a network of financial capitalism, which in turn is 
connected to the program of land certification. In the context of FLPP's operations, 
land certification is a basic requirement. The minister of housing, therefore, continues 
to urge the local government to facilitate the process of converting informal land to 
formally registered land, "especially for the lower income population."74
Soon after the launch of FLPP, Jamil Anshari, a housing deputy of the Ministry of 
Housing, announced that his agency "is collaborating with the National Land Agency 
(Badan Pertanahan Nasional, BPN) for a program to assist with land certification." 7 
Land certification will provide legal security for landowners, and, furthermore, 
Anshari continued, "the land certificate can be used for collateral and credits." 6 This 
view is broadly supported by the metropolitan press. Koran Jakarta's special edition on 
land policy summarized the benefit of land certification, explaining that it will lead not 
only to security of tenure but also certified landownership and an increase in land 
value. Moreover, "the certificate can be used for collateral for a loan."77 The program 
was welcomed by some homeowners who wanted their homes to be properly 
registered, even though they did not plan to use them as collateral.
The initiatives from the BPN and the Ministry of Housing received support from 
the president. In 2008, as part of the "pro-rakyat" program, President Yudhoyono 
launched a program oriented towards land certification for low-income populations.78 
The program is called Layanan Rakyat untuk Sertifikasi Tanah—Larasita (Service for 
People's Land Certification). Organized by BPN, this program aims at regularizing 
exchanges and ownership of land to end the informal system of land registration, 
which has often led to land disputes, unfair land acquisition by developers, and 
"illegal" land occupation by the urban poor. To show its full commitment to 
regularizing landownership, in 2008 the BPN (an institution which was notoriously 
corrupt during the Suharto era) issued a regulation to ease land certification.79 It also 
provides mobile registration services via 124 Larasita vans and 248 motor bikes that 
serve people in various cities and regencies in Indonesia who wish to certify their land 
for the first time (but may be unable to visit a BPN branch office).80 According to Joyo
74 "Agar Proses KPR Makin Lancar," Koran Jakarta, May 23, 2011, p. 16.
75 Wahyu Daniel, "Pemerintah Janji Bantu Sertifikasi Tanah Orang Miskin," May 21, 2011, http:/ /us. 
finance, detik.com/ read/ 2011 / 05/ 21 /143401 /1643910/1016/ pemerintah-janji-bantu-sertifikasi-tanah- 
orang-miskin, accessed September 27, 2011.
76 Ibid.
77 "Merata hingga ke Pelosok Desa," Koran Jakarta, May 23, 2011, p. 16.
78 Ismoko Widjaya, "Badan Pertanahan Tak Boleh Jadi Momok Lagi," Vivanews, December 16, 2008, 
http: / / us.nasional.vivanews.com/ news/ read/ 15981-_badan_pertanahan_tak_boleh_jadi_momok_lagi 
accessed June 19, 2012.
79 Ibid. The regulation is known as Peraturan Kepala BPN RI No. 6/ 2008.
80 Pipiet Tri Noorastuti and Beno Junianto, "Badan Pertanahan Luncurkan Mobil Keliling," Vivanews, 
February 9, 2009, http:/ /us.metro.vivanews.com/news/read/28457-badan_pertahanan_luncurkan_ 
mobil_keliling, accessed June 19, 2012.
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Winoto, the head of BPN, his bureau's efforts have received "great appreciation from 
the World Bank for pioneering mobile land information services."81
Larasita van, Jakarta, 2011 (photo by the author)
Land certification is not new to Indonesia. The World Bank has been promoting the 
program of land certification since the New Order, especially in the mid-1990s. For the 
World Bank, land regularization is a mechanism to integrate the informal land market 
into the formal economy; such integration promotes private landownership and 
homeownership, which are recognized as stimulating urban productivity. The 
registration program, however, was carried out reluctantly during the New Order. The 
main cause could be attributed to the logistical cost of administering the program, but 
there were also politically motivated reasons to leave large pieces of land largely 
unregistered (with BPN) throughout the New Order.
First, the Indonesian state was reluctant to give up its ownership of land (by 
allowing it to be formally registered to individuals). Control over land allowed the 
state to have ultimate power to decide at its convenience how the land should be used 
for "development." The period of "liberalization" in the 1990s, for instance, witnessed 
major private developers (with ties to Suharto's family) acquiring with relative ease 
and at low prices massive tracts of land in both Jakarta and its peri-urban area.81 2 Had
81 Widjaya, "Badan Pertanahan Tak Boleh Jadi Momok Lagi."
82 Bernard Dorleans, "Urban Land Speculation and City Planning Problems in Jakarta before the 1998 
Crisis," in The Indonesian Tozvn Revisited, ed. Peter J. M. Nas (Munster: Verlag and ISEAS, 2002), pp. 41-56. 
See also Tommy Firman, "Rural to Urban Land Conversion in Indonesia during Boom and Bust Periods," 
Land Use Policy 17,1 (2000): 13-20; and Haryo Winarso and Tommy Firman, "Residential Land
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all the land been registered at that time, developers would have found these properties 
both difficult and expensive to acquire.
Second, just as the government allowed land to be acquired and commodified, the 
state also recognized the legitimacy of irregular settlements where the urban poor 
lived. As discussed earlier, such recognition relieved the state from having to provide 
housing for some low-income populations. Furthermore, if the central government 
allowed the poor to stay informally on land in the city (regardless of any legal issues), 
these individuals could then help support development projects as informal, low-paid 
laborers. Those factors explain why, until the 1990s, according to the Hasfarm and 
Urban Institute report, "a large share of (housing) production takes place in the 
'informal sector'—84 percent [of the land being used for housing] by our definition ... 
the land titles that result from this process of informal subdivision are legal and convey 
full rights of ownership, but they generally remained unregistered."83 Hasfarm and 
Urban Institute analysts recognized that "in the future this informal production will be 
the only way of meeting urban housing demand,"84 but they recommended that the 
"government should seek ways to upgrade the standing of valid but unregistered titles 
so as to increase their security and permit them to be used as loan collateral, both for 
housing and for business loans."85The report's subtler notion of "upgrading" is open 
for interpretation, but in the context of any attempt to resolve the formal and informal 
dualism, it can be interpreted as recommending formal land certification as a way to 
end housing production by informal means.
The target of land certification is not limited to the unregistered land in the 
informal sector. It includes the land owned by the government that for reasons that 
will become clear, below, has been abandoned (terlantar). Since a significant portion of 
the informal kampung in Jakarta, which have become the main targets of evictions in 
the city today, are located on tanah terlantar (wasteland), we need to understand how 
this abandoned land came to be, as the explanation exposes the politics of land 
certification and the spatial politics in which the city is engaged.
Tanah Terlantar
Gunawan Wiradi, the Indonesian expert on agrarian law, points out that the 
campaign to encourage land certification today is clearly not just about land reform or 
the equitable distribution of land. Instead, it is also intended to quantify government- 
owned land, for "no one seems to know the amount of land owned by government," 
and to obtain information about how it is being used.86
The state does, indeed, own an unknown amount of land in the city. It is not clear 
when the term tanah terlantar first appeared in public, but it refers to "unused" land,
Development in Jabotabek, Indonesia: Triggering Economic Crisis?" Habitat International 26,4 (2002): 487- 
506.
83 Struyk et al., The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities, p. 352.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Riza Sofyat, Budi. Supriyantoro, dan Windarto, "Untuk Rakyat, Pengusaha, atau Parpol?" Trust 41, 
tahun VI, August 4-10, 2008, p. 13.
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such as that beneath highway overpasses, and along river banks and railway lines. The 
term may have emerged during the monetary crisis of 1998, for tanah terlantar seems to 
be reserved for the most marginal of the marginal. (Tanah terlantar has even been used 
by the government to accommodate the urban poor who needed space for temporary 
housing, especially during extraordinary economic crises.) To be clear, tanah terlantar is 
different from the vast majority of land in the city that is regulated through informal 
means (roughly 84 percent in the 1990s, as noted earlier).87 During the monetary crisis 
of 1998, the state allowed homeless people to occupy much of the tanah terlantar in 
Jakarta as a temporary solution to an affordable-housing shortage, and so many 
workers who had been laid off from factories in Jakarta's peri-urban areas returned to 
the city and sought work or employment in the informal sector. Such arrangements are 
considered by some as illegal squatting, but that can be misleading, for the derogatory 
term obscures the fact that the occupation took place with permission from the state, 
even though this decision dismayed city government officials.
Tanah terlantar comprises mostly marginal land, but may also encompass land 
suitable for development, such as Kemayoran, the former airport. In 1998-99, while 
waiting for developers to recover from the financial crisis and take over the 
development of Kemayoran, the state opened up some spaces of the vast airfield for 
spontaneous settlements, only to have settlers evicted later by the administrations of 
Sutiyoso and Fauzi Bowo. However, it is not easy to take back tanah terlantar once 
popular housing has been tolerated there. We just have to remember the complaint of 
Governor Sutiyoso (1997-2007) about having to evict the urban poor from the space 
beneath the turnpike after a fire: "The Public Works Ministry owns the land ... This is 
what happens when an institution gives out building permits to squatters under the 
turnpike. Who wants to take the responsibility for what has happened now?"88 The 
difficulty of taking back tanah terlantar is largely due to the manner in which 
settlements are formed and governed. It is far from spontaneous. Historically, settlers 
in Jakarta used the systematic practice of forming informal kampung. In the case of 
Kemayoran, there were Rukun Tetangga and Rnknn Warga (RT, RW; neighborhood 
associations), governed by oknums (officials who abuse power) related to the 
Kemayoran management office, and local security thugs controlled by the company.89 
Moreover, the settlements constituted an informal land market as well. In this sense, 
the practice behind the occupation of tanah terlantar and the establishment of informal 
kampung are similar, even though they are different in their historical formation. The 
inventory of land, by way of certification, will help to clarify the quantity, function, 
and condition of tanah terlantar, and, perhaps more importantly, to clear it from 
irregular settlements and thus prevent the expansion of the informal land market.
The current "new era" of housing policy, with its mandate to resolve the formal 
and informal dualism, would bring to an end such land irregularity. The goal of 
designating and clearing space for formal housing, for instance, rests increasingly on
87 Struyk et al., The Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities, p. 352.
88 Sutiyoso, as cited in the Jakarta Post, "Squatters Face Eviction in the Wake of Fire," Jakarta Post, August 31, 
2007.
89 For a description of the formation of kampung in the tanah terlantar of Kemayoran, see the report of 
Forum Warga Kota Jakarta (FAKTA), Altematif Pem/elesaian Sengketa Pemukiman Miskin Kota (Jakarta: 
FAKTA, 2006).
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programs of the state and city administration "to relocate squatters living on 
riverbanks, along railways tracks, and under elevated expressways."90 After clearing, 
tanah terlantar would be subjected to a measure of urban renewal. On the question of 
what to do with tanah terlantar after it is cleared of informal settlements, the city and 
the nation have different aspirations. The city government of Jakarta, for instance, 
prefers the greening of tanah terlantar to fulfill the need for green space in the city, 
whereas the Ministry of Housing continues to explore the possibility of turning select 
tanah terlantar into sites of low-income formal housing.91
There are thus several functions in land certification that could serve both 
progressive and regressive urban agendas. Land certification will lead to the 
broadening of land supply for formal housing or green space, but it will also close 
down the possibility of informal settlements and eliminate the historical role of tanah 
terlantar in meeting the needs of the urban poor. Both FLPP and land certification, 
which are part of the "pro-rakyat" programs, are meant to support the expansion of an 
urban formal land market. These programs will integrate informal government-owned 
land into the operation of such a land market. The mission of the Ministry of Housing 
to increase the demand for and supply of formal housing means that the role of 
informal housing to meet the needs of the urban poor would have to come to an end. 
The practice of resolving formal and informal dualism by way of land certification 
would lead to the eviction of the informal workers who are living in the informally 
regulated lands. This is the coercive side of the new housing program, that is, the 
displacement of informal workers from their informally regulated lands and their 
exclusion from programs meant to benefit the poor.
Finally, land certification also plays an important role in controlling urban 
population growth. In Jakarta, land certification would help the city's mission to 
eradicate the kampung that have been built on tanah terlantar, such as on river banks, 
along railway tracks, and beneath toll roads. It would help reduce the size of 
Indonesia's kawasan kumuh, which in 2010, according to the minister of housing, had 
gone up to 57,000 hectare.92 It would also help the city's bylaws, or "Raperda" 
(Rancangan Peraturan Daerah) on the 2010-30 spatial planning (Rencana Tata Ruang 
Wilayah, RTRW) agenda to limit the number of Jakarta's population to twelve 
million.93 It would assist the city with its demographic control program, Operasi Yustisi 
Kependudukan (OYK, Operation for Population Control), which is intended to evict 
vendors and migrants who occupy irregular settlements (as explained below).
We now turn to Jakarta to reflect on the city's challenge to implement pro-poor 
housing policies. I explore the failure of the city's recent, short-lived 1,000 Towers 
program (2006-10). The 1,000 Towers program was the one and only major state- 
subsidized pro-poor housing program implemented prior to the invention of the FLPP. 
While short-lived, it is important historically, for its demise brought to an end state
90 Such a program is a consistent feature of the city government. The quotation is from Governor Sutiyoso 
(1997-2007), as cited in the ]ahirta Post, "Squatters Face Eviction in the Wake of Fire."
91 "Dikaji, Pembangunan Rusunawa di Pinggir Rel KA," Inforum 1 (2010): 30.
92 Suharso Monoarfa, "Lebih dekat dengan Menteri Negara Perumahan Rakyat Suharso Monoarfa," p. 16
93 As pointed out by Margani Mustar, a municipal officer for population and settlement; see 
"Pengendalian Penduduk Jakarta," Koran Jakarta, October 2, 2010, p. 4.
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subsidies for low-cost housing and gave rise to the current FLPP program. An 
examination of the 1,000 Towers program also allows us to speculate on the prospects 
for and influence of the current perumahan rakyat project on the future urban form of 
Jakarta.
PART III: The Practice
The 1,000 Towers: A Lesson from the Recent Past
Decentralization in Indonesia has expanded the city's authority. Jakarta has the 
power to establish its own agenda. Yet, while "Jakarta is no longer the satellite of the 
central government," the city is not free from the state's influence.94 Government 
Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) no. 38/2007, for instance, obliges the local 
government (pemda) to provide housing for its low-income population.9S 96The 
broadening of the city's authority thus comes with an obligation to produce low-cost 
housing, which previously was the responsibility of the state. Such delegation of 
authority is often at odds with the priorities of the city. For Jakarta, with its problem of 
land scarcity and growing population, housing the urban poor has always been a 
challenge. The city has its own set of priorities, namely, to turn Jakarta into a world 
class "service city" (kota jasa), which basically means an investment-friendly city that 
facilitates consumption, "where everyone visiting the city could be well-served."9n 
Such an aspiration is at odds with the state's initiative to build low-cost apartments in 
the city.
The Ministry of Housing nevertheless continues to warn that pemda should show 
initiative in developing for housing, especially by providing land for perumahan rakyat. 
To stress the urgency of his call, Minister of Housing Suharso Monoarfa has even 
outlined a mission for the pemda: "Many people are in need of housing, especially civil 
servants and people who live in the kawasan kumuh. Building houses and apartments 
for civil servants and revitalizing kawasan kumuh should be the pemda's priority so that 
people do not have to keep renting in the future."97 More specifically, he says:
I urge pemda to provide [a] land bank for housing ... lands in strategic places that 
are still cheap can be bought with local government budget (APBD). Land is an 
asset which can be sold to developers interested in building low-cost housing. In 
the past, during the tenure of Ali Sadikin, Pemda DKI bought lands in strategic 
places in Jakarta even though this is not being done any more. Local government 
should not be afraid to invest in land, because it is to fulfill the need of rakyat.98
94 The quotation is from former Minister of Environment Sarwono Kusumaatmadja during his bid for 
governor. See: "Candidates Say No to Sharia Based Bylaws," Jakarta Post, August 1, 2006.
95 "Pemda Belum Peduli Perumahan," Kompas, November 9, 2009, p. 23.
96 Fauzi Bowo's aspirations for Jakarta stem from his term as the head of tourism for the city government 
of Jakarta during the administration of Governor Surjadi Soedirdja (1992-97), who had the ambition of 
turning Jakarta into a "Global City." See Suwardiman, "Perjalanan Karir Fauzi Bowo," Kompas, August 2, 
2007, p. 34.
97 "(Susahnya) berharap pada Inisiatif Pemda," Koran Jakarta, May 16, 2011, p. 16.
98 "Bebaskan IMB atau Tak Dapat DAK," Koran Jakarta, October 1, 2010, p. 16; see also "Kemenpera Ajak 
Pemda Sediakan Bank Tanah Untuk Perumahan," Media Indonesia, May 26, 2011.
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Such suggestions have been repeatedly issued by housing ministers, an indication 
that it is difficult to make the pemda take the perumahan rakyat seriously." At the time 
when the city is marketing its land for prestigious projects, such as office buildings, 
condominiums, and hotels, as well as converting its remaining land to green spaces, a 
project involving the perumahan rakyat is a painful reminder to the city that its available 
land is limited. It also raises a series of questions that haunt governors: Who owns 
Jakarta? How many people can the city accommodate? What kind of people does the 
city want as residents? Should the perumahan rakyat be located in the city, at the peri­
urban locations, or on the outskirts of the city? Should accommodating the perumahan 
rakyat be the responsibility of other regions?
When Monoarfa became minister of housing in 2009, he had already realized that it 
would be quite impossible for Jakarta to find land for low-cost housing. Prior to his 
appointment, a major attempt had already been made to build low-cost apartments in 
Jakarta, but the program, known as the 1,000 Towers, ended in failure. In the following 
section I provide an account of that failed government project, as it is relevant to 
understanding the current challenge of Jakarta in responding to the pro-poor housing 
initiative.
In August 2006, outspoken Vice President Jusuf Kalla put forward his populist 
"pro-rakyat" low-cost housing project, known as the 1,000 Towers. By then, according 
to the vice president, the low-income population in Jakarta numbered two million.9 100 
His 1,000 Towers project was meant "to eliminate the image of a poor city."101 'Today," 
Kalla pointed out in 2006, "the image of poverty for Indonesia is not coming from the 
hinterland of Mount Kidul. Instead, the symbol of Indonesian poverty comes from the 
shanty towns along the Ciliwung River [of Jakarta]."102 Kalla therefore suggested that 
one thousand low-cost apartment towers be built, and that 50 percent of them be 
located in Jakarta and its surrounding neighborhoods. The government would allocate 
fifty triliun rupiah (five billion US dollars) for this project.103 Kalla expected that the 
1,000 Towers program would bring the urban poor out of their slum-like environments, 
and, furthermore, the poor would not have to live far from Jakarta, because many of 
the towers would be located in the city. With such housing in the city, the vice 
president reasoned, there would be a reduction in commuting traffic, too.104 Many 
commuters are workers who cannot afford to live in Jakarta, so, if there were 
affordable housing available in the city, commuters would be among the most likely 
buyers. Characteristic of Kalla, the project was fast-tracked. In 2009 alone, Jabodetabek
99 The state's complaints about the reluctance of pemda to provide land for low-cost housing were noted in 
several media reports: "Pemda Belum Peduli Perumahan," Kompas; "Kemenpera Ajak Pemda Sediakan 
Bank Tanah Untuk Perumahan," Media Indonesia; and "Bebaskan IMB atau Tak Dapat DAK" and 
"(Susahnya) Berharap pada Inisiatif Pemda," Koran Jakarta.
100 Ita Lismawati F. Malau and Bayu Galih, "Duo Yusuf Resmikan Rusunami," vivanews.com, March 5, 
2009, http: / / us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/ 36396-duo_yusuf_resmikan_rusunami, accessed June 
19,2012.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 "No Room for Cheap Apartments: Fauzi," Jakarta Post, August 16, 2006.
104 Some 88.6 percent of 4.5 million commuters live on the outskirts of the city. Ibid.
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(Jakarta-Bogor-Depok-Tangerang-Bekasi) was expected to get eighty-seven of the 
towers.105 By 2011, all 1,000 towers were expected to have been built all over Indonesia.
For any developer in Jakarta, the call from Kalla was a call that spoke of fortune. 
The possibility of acquiring land in the city and taking part in a project backed by 
government subsidies was an opportunity too good to be true. With the vice president, 
nicknamed "Mr. Action," behind the program, developers expected that they could 
challenge Governor Fauzi Bowo, who, in response to Kalla's program, declared that 
"Jakarta simply has no space for cheap apartments."106 The governor pointed out that 
the city has only 1 percent of an area of 650 square kilometers that can be used for 
housing. Be that as it may, in the mind of developers, there are ways to get around 
such limitations.
By 2008, two years after the 1,000 Towers agenda was launched, almost all major 
developers had submitted applications to build low-cost towers, known then as 
riisunami (rumah susun sederhana milik, low-cost government subsidized ownership 
apartments). For the first time in the history of Indonesian housing, perumahan rakyat 
became a major enterprise for big, private developers in Jakarta. The then minister of 
housing, Mohammad Yusuf As'yari, was very pleased to see the participation of 
"major developers such as Agung Podomoro Group, Modernland Realty, and 
Bakrieland."107 So popular was the program that Properti Review, a real-estate magazine, 
called the phenomenon "Boom Apartement Rakyat," especially "After the Kings of 
Property Arrived."108 The media attributed the popularity of 1,000 Towers to the 
generous government subsidy for the project. In 2008, the government provided 800 
milyar rupiah (eighty million US dollars) to subsidize the project, and in 2009 the 
financial support jumped to 2.3 triliun rupiah (230 million US dollars).109 Vice President 
Kalla even promised 10 triliun rupiah (one billion US dollars) to support the project.110 1
Subsidies were a major attraction, but the opportunity to acquire scarce land within the 
city limits was probably the main driving force behind the developers' interest. In this 
1,000 Towers project, developers took advantage of partnerships with government 
institutions that own land in the city.m PT Bakrieland development, for instance, 
formed a partnership with Perumnas (Perumahan Nasional), a state-owned housing 
company, in order to gain access to its forty hectares of land in East Jakarta.112
While developers promoted their rusunami in the language of pro-rakyat, patriotism 
and corporate responsibility, it has become clear that, at least in Jakarta, the 1,000 
Towers project was a vehicle for private developers to acquire the remaining "unused" 
or informally registered state land in the city. Moreover, soon it also became clear that
105 "Permohonan Bangun Rusunami Capai 432 Tower," Kompas, March 21, 2009, wwwl.kompas.com/ 
readkotatua/xml/2009/03/21/08171596/ permohonan.bangun.rusunami.capai.432.tower, accessed June 
19, 2012.
106 "No Room for Cheap Apartments," Jakarta Post.
107 Muhamad Yusuf Asy'ari, "Saya Happy ..."  Property Review 1,9 (March 2008): 11.
108 Herman Syahara, "Setelah Raja-raja Properti Turun Gunung," Property Review 1,9 (March 2008): 6-7.
109 "Permohonan Bangun Rusunami Capai 432 Tower," Kompas.
110 Malau and Galih, "Duo Yusuf Resmikan Rusunami."
111 "Lahan, Kendala PembangunanRusunami," Kompas, February 19, 2009, wwwl.kompas.com/ 
readkotatua/xml/2009/02/19/ 18073724/lahan.kendala.pembangunan.rusunami.
112 Herman Syahara, "Ambisi Membangun Kota Perumnas," Property Review 1,9 (March 2008): 20.
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nisunami in the city were just too valuable to serve only the modest- to low-income 
market. Buyers from the upper-middle-income tier were also invited to sign up for 
tower housing. The towers' exterior designs were modest to suggest a low-income 
clientele, but their interiors were designed to attract those from the upper middle class 
who were seeking an apartment in the city. An impression from a visitor to the 
showroom of Kalibata Residence (one of the rusunami built by Agung Podomoro 
Group), for instance, reveals the developers' trick: "The model and the interior of one 
of the show units made my heart beat. The design is classy. To access the tower, one 
needs an access card. The complex is supported by shopping and fitness centers. There 
are facilities provided by the developer for the security and comfort of the 
occupants."113 Furthermore, there are plenty of parking spaces for cars in the tower 
described here and "if one looks at the location, it becomes clear that the tower is a 
strategic place for investment."114 Firdaus Turmudji, a member of city council, also 
observed that developers had taken advantage of all the facilities from the state 
(subsidy and location) to build middle-class condominiums instead of low-cost 
apartments. Turmudji pointed out that "permission was given to build subsidized 
apartments for the low-income population, but in reality only a few units were made 
available for such purpose. The rest are luxurious apartments."115
By the middle of 2009, it became clear that the 1,000 Towers project had missed its 
target. Kompas, a national newspaper, reported that, through May 2009, forty thousand 
rusunami units had been sold, but "subsidized credits were only given to two thousand 
units."116 The small number of credit users indicates that, as property analyst 
Panangian Simanungkalit pointed out, "most of the consumers [buyers] are well off, as 
they paid cash."117 Zulfi Syarif, from the Ministry of Housing, also acknowledged that 
"ownership of rusunami is dominated by upper middle class."118 Syarif conceded that 
the failure resulted from the fact that the government focused only on the supply of 
rusunami, and it did not control the demand side.
Fewer than three years after it was initiated, the 1,000 Towers project fell apart, 
primarily because it was not supported by any sustained funding scheme and because 
of the lax enforcement of the requirements that were intended to determine which 
developers should receive the government subsidy.119 By 2009, the 1,000 Towers project 
had slowed down, and it stopped altogether in 2010 when the subsidy from the 
government was halted for reasons that are not entirely clear.
The failure of the 1,000 Towers project contributed to the demise of government 
subsidies for housing. What we also learn from the case of the 1000 Towers is that
113 "Kalibata City, Kayaknya sihRusunami Keren," Kompas, March 21, 2009, wwwl.kompas.com/read 
kotatua/ xml/ 2009/ 03/ 21 / 10252770/kalibata.city.kayaknya.sih.rusunami.keren, accessed June 10, 2011.
114 Ibid.
115 "Pembangunan Apartemen Kalibata City Harus Dievaluasi," Post Kota, July 29, 2011, www.poskota. 
co.id / berita-terkini/ 2011 / 07/29/ pembangunan-apartemen-kalibata-city-harus-dievaluasi, accessed June 
12,  2011.
116 "Rusunami Diduga Salah Sasaran," Kompas, June 20, 2009.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 "Pembangunan Rusunami Anjlok 70Persen," Kompas, July 15, 2009, http: / / tekno.kompas.com/read/ 
2009/07/15/16220516/Pembangunan.Rusunami.Anjlok.70.Persen, accessed June 19, 2012.
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developers continue to take advantage of government programs, especially ones that 
concern land acquisition. For the 1,000 Towers, developers argued that the failure of 
the subsidy scheme prompted them to broaden the rusunami market to include 
members of the upper-middle class.120 The developers made no effort to disguise the
Work on Kemanggisan Residence, in West Jakarta, one of the 1,000 Towers, was halted 
(photo courtesy of Suryono Herlambang)
fact that they had already been making plans for the day when they could find any 
reason to abandon their commitment to perumahan rakyat. 121 In retrospect, we could say 
that developers anticipated the failure of the 1,000 Towers mission, and they prepared
120 Ibid. See also Ali Imron, "Pengembang Mulai Ubah Rusunami Jadi Apartemen," Kompas, April 7, 2009, 
http: / /bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/ 2009/ 04/ 07/19012033/ Pengembang.Mulai.Ubah.Rusunami.Ja 
di.Apartemen, accessed June 10, 2011.
121 In the first quarter of 2009, as developers started to promote the towers, the municipality of Jakarta
i mplemented sealing orders (i.e., cancellations) on eight rusunami projects for failing to obtain building 
permits (Izin Mendirikan Bangunan, IMB) and failing to submit reports on environmental impacts (amdal). 
The city government disapproved of the excessive floor coverage ratio (Koefisien Lantai Bangunan, KLB), 
of the towers' units, for it disregarded the limits of the available infrastructure and the density of the 
neighborhood where the towers are located. For developers, however, a large KLB (square meters) is 
needed to ensure profitability of rusunami, and they argued that the previous governor of Jakarta had 
signed off on the KLBs and it was thus illegal for the current administration to stop development. Some 
developers argued that the sealing orders and the uncertainty about government subsidy schemes 
prompted them to open rusunami for the upper-middle class. See "Tangan besi di Daerah," Koran Jakarta, 
December 6, 2010, p. 16; see also Emilius Caesar Alexey, "DKI Menyegel Rusun Kalibata," 
Properti.kompas.com, April 1, 2009, http: / / properti.kompas.
com/read/2009/04/01/05272148/DKI.Menyegel.Rusun.Kalibata, accessed June 12, 2011.
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an exit plan that contributed to the failure of the project. For the 1,000 Towers' project, 
developers in Jakarta designed the supposedly low-cost apartments for a middle-class 
life style with the expectation that, at the right moment, the rusunami could be easily 
converted into upper-middle-class apartments.122
The 1,000 Towers program ended in 2010, replaced eventually by yet another 
program, called FLPP, which, as I discussed in the previous section, is centered on 
financing demand instead of supply. Yet, no matter how innovative the FLPP might 
turn out to be (especially given its exclusion of informal workers), in Jakarta it still has 
to deal with the issue of limited space, undesirable locations, and the political 
geography of the capital city, which has increasingly become an exclusive city for its 
upper-middle-class residents. As Jakarta has less and less space to accommodate 
irregular settlements, the city has evolved into a place where an inner-central layer is 
increasingly dominated by "superblocks," exclusively occupied by elites and upper- 
middle-class persons who have "returned to the city."123 124Connected to the center is the 
peri-urban area with its own clusters of upper-middle-class housing, and, as I will 
discuss in the next section, those spaces farther away where new migrants reside, 
along with those former city residents evicted from informal land by, ironically, the 
supposedly pro-rakyat housing program.
Too Far to Live
As pointed out above, Minister of Housing Suharso Monoarfa was often quite 
frustrated by the reluctance of the city government to collaborate on the project of 
housing the poor. He even warned that "matters concerning housing are now the 
responsibility of the region, as this has been arranged in our constitution [undang- 
undang]. If there is a governor who doesn't pay attention to housing, then one should 
question his or her commitment to his or her own rakyat."124 Invoking “rakyat" to 
remind local government of its responsibility shows that the notion of rakyat continues 
to carry weight, even though it has often been used and abused for interests that have 
nothing to do with the rakyat. The notion nevertheless still connotes legitimacy, 
leadership, and the moral community in Indonesia.125 The central government is now 
mandating the city and its residents to take care of rakyat—a task that was previously 
assigned to the nation-state.
While the reality of rakyat has often been neglected by the ruling elites, it cannot be 
totally ignored. Governor Fauzi Bowo knows this perfectly well. He is quick to point 
out that even though there is no space available in the city for inexpensive apartments 
(especially after the 1,000 Towers program took up most of the unused land), his 
administration is committed to serve the rakyat's need for housing. He points out that 
his administration has been building low-cost rental apartments (rumah susun sewa —
122 Imron, "Pengembang Mulai Ubah Rusunami Jadi Apartemen."
123 For a discussion of "superblocks" and "back to the city," see Abidin Kusno, The Appearances o f Memory: 
Mnemonic Practices o f  Architecture and Urban Form in Indonesia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 
pp. 71-100.
124 Suharso Monoarfa, as cited in "Bebaskan IMB atau Tak Dapat DAK," Koran Jakarta.
125 For a discussion of the changing meaning of rakyat, see lames Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: 
Counter-Revolution Today (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
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rusunawa). For the city government, in a country that seeks to promote property 
ownership, building rental apartments for the low-income population shows, indeed, a 
commitment to serve the rakyat, even though the number of these units is still far 
below the target, since the city government is capable of providing only one thousand 
units per year, far below the target of seventy thousand units. 26
The problem, however, is not the limited supply, but the extremely low demand. 
The occupancy rate of units that are available is very low. Koran Jakarta reports that, as 
of 2010, Jakarta has 5,600 units available, or fifty-six rental towers, in thirteen locations, 
but three thousand units, or thirty towers, are empty, even though the rent is already 
low, "between 120 to 350 thousand rupiah (twelve to thirty-five dollars) per month."126 27 
In other words, the majority of the low-income population has not gained access to 
rusunawa. The reasons have been multiple, ranging from the fact that the poor are 
simply too poor to pay even the already low rent to problems of poor building 
maintenance to, most importantly, the towers' locations, which are too far from the city, 
so that accessing public transport remains a problem.
Teguh Satria, a council member of Real Estate Indonesia, indicated that "the 
challenge of rusunawa is location."128 In Satria's opinion, location close to the city would 
be favorable, but, as Governor Fauzi Bowo has already pointed out, there is simply no 
space available inside the city limits for cheap apartments. There are also reports of 
abuse by officers in charge of rusunawa who make money by renting only to those who 
can pay more than what a low-income renter would be asked to pay. Aside from the 
problems of poor infrastructure and bureaucratic corruption, there is also a 
requirement that further limits the accessibility of rusunawa. Agus Subardiono, head of 
the city's Housing and Building Department, has explained that "it is not easy for 
people to get one rusunawa unit. There is a selection process. Priority is given to 
residents who have been evicted from Jakarta's riverside and beneath the toll road. 
Only the low-income population is accepted, but (in any case) they have to carry a 
Jakarta resident ID."129 Rusunawa, which is supposed to accommodate the poorest, 
contains its own structure of exclusion. And, in the context of Jakarta's own agenda to 
minimize the number of commuters and to curb population growth, rusunawa, in its 
location at the periphery, serves to define the limit of the city.
Limited space has certainly exacerbated the difficulties of accommodating the 
urban poor in Jakarta, but the strategic plan to limit Jakarta's inner-city population has 
added to that problem. As Margani Mustar, a deputy of Population and Settlement 
from city government, pointed out, for a city with a population that continues to grow, 
"Population control is a priority of the Jakarta administration."130 According to Mustar, 
his office has been kept busy with controlling the population increase. Since the end of
126 "Dorong Pemda cepat bergerak," Koran Jakarta, February 21, 2011, p. 16. Meanwhile, Koran Jakarta has 
noted that "Jakarta residents need 70,000 units rusunawa, but because of the low budget, the city 
government can only build 800 to 1,000 units per year." See "9  Rusunawa Segera Dibangun," Koran Jakarta, 
January 17, 2011, p. 6.
127 "Kerja Keras Bangun Rusunawa," Koran Jakarta, September 20, 2010, p. 16; and "9 Rusunawa Segera 
Dibangun," Koran Jakarta.
128 "Dorong Pemda cepat bergerak," Koran Jakarta.
129 "9 Rusunawa Segera Dibangun," Koran Jakarta.
130 "DKI Batasi Jumlah Penduduk," Koran Jakarta, September 30, 2010, p. 6.
52 Abidin Kusno
2010, transmigration, OYK, and family planning have been carried out simultaneously 
in the five administrative territories of Jakarta. The OYK targets, especially, "densely 
populated settlements, rented houses [rumah kos], low-cost apartment buildings, and 
employment agencies ... to look for those who don't have ID, have no permanent 
residence, and are unemployed."131 These indigents will be sent to "the city's social 
work department [and] after rehabilitation will be sent back to their home town."132
Given the Jakarta administration's focus on reducing its marginalized population, 
it is perhaps too much to expect that the city will house them. What the municipality 
has done is to build rusunawa at the outskirts of the city, hoping that Jakarta's peri­
urban surroundings will absorb the surplus population evicted from the urban center. 
Both rusunawa and the OYK thus are projects that bring together society and space in 
defining, along class lines, the center and the margin of Jakarta. They raise a question 
of where perumahan rakyat should be located in a city where the devolution of power 
from the nation to the city continues to perpetuate spatial division, social inequality, 
and poverty.
If historical consideration and comments on the present produce only a gloomy 
narrative of continuity, and if the revolution in the financing of pro-poor housing is, 
after all, a movement that only continues to deny the rights of the poor to live in 
Jakarta, what is left to imagine for the future of the city? If the progress of Jakarta 
necessarily involves evictions of the poor, it is not difficult to imagine what the future 
of Jakarta will look like. In the following section, I discuss a book by Zaenuddin HM 
called Jakarta: 500 Years that projects a "desirable" future by setting Jakarta in some era 
to come.133 This book does not, however, describe how the transition from the actual to 
the utopian could be made. What I have discussed so far in three parts above (i.e., the 
1,000 Towers program, the role of finance capital, the FLPP, land certification, and the 
creation of card-carrying credit-worthy citizens) can be seen as providing a context for 
Zaenuddin's end-of-history book.
PARTIV: Utopia?
The Chosen Population
In 2008, the year when major developers (in collaboration with state enterprises) 
acquired the last pieces of urban land for the 1,000 Towers program, Zaenuddin HM, a 
senior journalist and writer, wrote a futuristic book titled Jakarta: 500 Years —Obsession 
and Hope of Jakarta in the Year 2027. He wrote:
In 2027, Jakarta will only be occupied by a "chosen population" [orang-orang 
terpilih] ... Jakarta will no longer be attractive for migrants who flocked into the 
city [from villages] after Ramadhan. People will think twice about coming to the 
city because the selection is harsh, so that population growth can be controlled. 
The selectivity of the Jakarta population is accompanied by the strict policy of the 
Jakarta government towards newcomers. Those who came only by means of
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Zaenuddin HM, Jakarta 500 Tahun.
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determination [nekat] will be restricted by regulation. They will be arrested and 
deported back to their home town.134 13567
Zaenuddin wrote his book as a "Betawi who is also a resident of Jakarta." He hopes 
that it will be useful for "readers, especially policy makers, who care about the future 
of Jakarta."133 The book could be read as a satirical warning, but it could also be seen as 
a projection of a desirable future currently under construction. We do not know how 
Zaenuddin's vision has been received, but Governor Fauzi Bowo has responded by 
endorsing the book. The governor is hopeful that "the book will bring the government 
and people of Jakarta together in responding to the challenges and problems the city is 
facing by making use of every potential and opportunity that has come to the city."13b 
This brave and also creepy book of the future, however, is unambiguously written 
from the perspective of the present. In 2027 (when Jakarta will celebrate its five- 
hundredth birthday), "the urban poor [such as gepeng, or beggars and vagrants] will 
have no place in a city populated only by the 'chosen people.'"13'Jakarta will not 
tolerate people without skills and will only welcome those who can participate in and 
contribute to a city filled with "international business."138 Given the discourses on 
housing in contemporary Indonesia and the ongoing dislocation of people who are 
part of the "informal" sector in Jakarta, Zaenuddin's vision of the future is not baseless, 
nor is it an illusion. Written to celebrate "Visit Indonesia 2008," the book registers the 
idea that future aspirations are as important as—if not more important than—present 
realities. The contents of the book deal with today's dreams and nightmares. It covers 
topics (as listed in the table of contents) such as: "Jakarta, Green Garden," "Jam-Free 
Traffic," "Goodbye Flooding," "The Chosen People," "Get Out, Gepeng," 
"Demography," "Welcome Business City," "Global Restaurant," "Silaturrahmi Jazz," 
and "Memories of Old City," and ends with "Back to Religion," as if to thank the 
creator, for, after all, "God is above everything."
Three chapters of this book focus on problems associated with Jakarta's population. 
Zainuddin envisions a Jakarta transformed by a spatial planning initiative stretching 
from 2010 to 2030, and he imagines that by 2027 "twelve million people will have been 
formally registered ... everyone has an ID, an address, and a profession."139 As a result 
of this transformation, there will be no "informal" people remaining in the capital, 
none of the poor residents who previously lived in unpredictable conditions, 
dependent on uncertain livelihoods.
Zaenuddin's work is grounded in the contemporary challenges facing Jakarta and 
its aspiration for a transformed society, one that is based on the eradication of kawasan 
kumuh, regularization of land, and the control of its population growth. His future 
Jakarta is also predicated on Jakarta's peri-urban area absorbing a large share of 
population evicted voluntarily or by force from their informal spaces and livelihoods
134 Zaenuddin HM, Jakarta 500 Tahun, pp. 43, 45, 46.
135 Ibid., p. viii.
136 Ibid., p. vi.
137 Ibid., p. 51.
135 Ibid., p. 45.
139 Ibid., p. 47.
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in the city. This area is outside the scope of Zainuddin's utopianism, even as it is 
expected to absorb problems that Jakarta seeks to externalize.
The Future Urban Form
Towards the end of 2010, Koran Jakarta reported that "in the past two decades, 
Bekasi, Depok, Tangerang, and Bogor (Bodetabek) have been the place for the 
development of rumah sejahtera [prosperous housing for the poor], but today this 
region has been filled with upper-middle-class residences."140 The vice chairman of 
Real Estate Indonesia, Muhammad Nawir, has observed that "the land price in 
Bodetabek has become expensive. It is no longer possible to build rumah sejahtera there 
that cost less than sixty juta rupiah (six thousand US dollars) per unit."141 Prompted by 
the increase in the price of land in peri-urban Jakarta, the state housing developer, 
Perumnas, which has pioneered low-cost housing in peri-urban locations since its 
establishment in the 1970s, has also turned to the more lucrative business of middle- 
class housing projects. Where have the low-income housing projects gone? According 
to Teddy Robinson Siahaan, director of marketing for Perumnas, "they have gone 
farther and farther away, now they are located in Karawang, Cikopo, and, on a smaller 
scale, Cikarang."142 Siahaan explained that target buyers for such housing would not be 
from Jakarta. Instead, the houses will be "more for the locals, civil servants, and 
members of the military and police."143 14
With the decrease of affordable housing in Jakarta's peri-urban areas, where have 
the evictees, the poor, and the informal workers gone? What can we say of those who 
have been displaced from the city? There is no straightforward answer to this, but 
what we have begun to hear are discursive forms of discontent. For instance, in 
January 2011, Kompas reported that the peri-urban areas have increasingly become the 
hotspot of criminal activities: "Hotspots for crimes seem to have been increasingly 
happening at the borders of Jakarta, Tangerang, and Depok, especially the theft of 
motor bikes ... There are also thefts taking place in informal rental places (kos and 
kontrakan)."144 The reason, according to Kompas, is "the weak social ties between people 
who live in those areas."145 These are petty crimes, but they are significant, for the 
targets are modest- to low-income people who travel to work (very likely in Jakarta) by 
motor bike and, as newcomers, rent apartments in the peri-urban. Meanwhile, a series 
of violent incidents in peri-urban Jakarta have also been reported. They involved 
attacks by some Islamic mass organizations on religious minorities.146 We cannot say 
that there is a connection between the evictions of the urban poor to the fringe of the 
city and the increased hotspots of crimes and violence in the peri-urban area. There is 
no evidence that the marginalized populations who are displaced into the periphery
140 "Menjauh dari Ibu Kota" Koran Jakarta, October 1, 2010, p. 16.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 "Tifip Rawan Kejahatan Ibu Kota," Kompas, January 13, 2011, p. 25.
145 Ibid.
146 Haryanto, "Attacks on Christian Congregations Soaring, Rights Group Reports," Jakarta Globe, July 27, 
2010; Iman Firdaus, "Mencari Musuh Islam Sebenarnya," Forum Keadilan 27, October 30, 2005, pp. 18-19.
Housing the Margin 55
are more likely to be involved in the thefts, robbery, and violent acts, but, left alone, 
without social protection, they have become the target of violent acts. Or one could 
also imagine a scenario of dystopia similar to that indicated by Mike Davis, where hard 
line religious organizations are stepping in to fill the gaps left open by disillusionment 
with the promise of and the right to the city.147
The Jakarta of the future is likely to accommodate the middle class and seek to 
repress visible evidence of a subordinate population. The "outcast" is expected to give 
up on Jakarta, as the future city would be populated only by Zaenuddin's "chosen 
people," who will live in a center harmonized by their collective imagined isolation 
from the subordinate class and social conflicts. The chosen twelve million 
cosmopolitan elites in Jakarta will be joined by another "chosen population" living in 
the clusters of gated new towns of the peri-urban, which will include more and more 
exclusive housing complexes.148 Surrounding them will be perhaps clusters of urban 
and rural interstitial zones, with life organized increasingly under the influence of 
Sharia law. Cutting across these different layers of space are the vagrants, the informal 
workers, and the poor who continue to float in and out of the city.149
There are, for sure, members of the subordinated class who persist and manage to 
stay in Jakarta, thanks in part to the efforts of NGOs. The urban renewal program's 
eviction of the poor has, indeed, been challenged by pro-poor activism among NGOs, 
such as efforts undertaken by the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) and the Forum of 
Urban Citizen (Forum Warga Kota Jakarta, FAKTA).150These forces are sometimes 
successful, but mostly they have failed in reclaiming the urban center for the poor.151 
The NGOs have been at the forefront in defending the rights of the urban poor to stay
147 Mike Davis, "Planet of Sums," New Left Review 26 (March-April 2004): 5-34.
148 The Islamic housing complexes have been proliferating in peri-urban Jakarta. In Depok alone there are 
at least fourteen Islamic housing complexes that have put the city at the top of the list for Islamic housing 
production. Yet, while the Islamic housing complexes could be said to be responding to the influence of 
Islam and Sharia law promoted by the Islamic political party, PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperity 
and Justice Party), they exhibit the same shortcomings as do other Jakarta housing complexes. The design 
of Islamic complexes does not include housing for the poor. Instead, these exclusive complexes have 
contributed to the loss of affordable land for the construction of low-income housing around the city.
149 It is appropriate to reflect on the words of Terry McGee, the guru of Southeast Asian cities, who 
predicted the future of Indonesian housing before the collapse of the Suharto regime:
Indonesians now live in three main types of housing: The wealthy mostly occupy single-family 
houses in large developments on the edge of the cities, or high-rise apartments in the city core. The 
middle class, which now comprises a majority of the urban population, lives in smaller houses in 
suburbs scattered throughout the periphery of cities, and in upgraded "kampung" style houses 
within city boundaries. For the urban poor, the majority now live in legalized and upgraded 
squatter settlements, or in low-rise, walk-up, low-income housing.
See Terry McGee, "The Future of Urbanisation in Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia," Third 
World Planning Rei>ieu> 16,1 (1994): xi.
150 The conflict between the urban poor and urban politics in Jakarta is outside the scope of this paper. For 
a report on the roles of NGOs in defending the urban poor in Kemayoran, see R. B. E. Agung Nugroho 
and the Ambar Prihastomo, Alternatif Penyelesaian Sengketa Pemukiman Miskin Kota, Forum Warga Kota 
Jakarta (Jakarta: FAKTA, 2006). For an exploration of living in the "urban periphery" in Jakarta (and 
elsewhere) as the basis for both survival and hope, see Abdoumaliq Simone, City Life from Jakarta to Dakar: 
Movements at the Crossroads (London: Routledge, 2010).
151 For a discussion on the work of an NGO in providing urban services for an informal settlement, see 
Lana Winayanti and Heracles C. Lang, "Provision of Urban Services in an Informal Settlement: A Case 
Study of Kampung Penas Tanggul, Jakarta," Habitat International 28 (2004): 41-65.
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in the city, and they have been involved in mobilizing the resources of the poor so that 
they could house themselves, but we still do not know for sure what the future holds 
for the evictees, the poor, and those who are housed and work informally.|S2 
Irreducible, they may continue to "disappear" into any kind of spatial interface they 
can find in both the city and the peri-urban areas, creating their own centers at the 
margin of urban spaces. Some, if not most, however, may give up the city's promises of 
modernity, its wheel of fortune, and its slogan of "city for all," and disappear into 
hard-line mass organizations that are pressing for a different foundation for the urban 
future. Disillusioned by their steady and gradual eviction from the city and robbed of 
their hope to live there, the marginalized could be recruited by hard-line organizations 
to attack the city from the periphery. This would look like the geography of dystopia, 
which poses an uncertain future for the city. There is a good deal to be gloomy about. 
Jakartans, however, may not currently think much of policy and politics, for they have 
come to realize that in a place like Jakarta, new policy will rapidly become obsolete, 
and the future will be pretty much like the present and the past. Yet, while today may 
resemble the past, it looks forward to more possibilities.
Whatever the future may be, Jakartans today must acknowledge that the low- 
income population is being displaced farther and farther away from the city. What this 
essay tries to show is merely that such displacement could be conducted under the 
name of perumahan rakyat. As the term perumahan rakyat continues to be invoked by the 
center for its own renewal, it risks being betrayed one more time.
152 During the election campaign for governor, neither Adang Dorodjatun (who is supported by PKS) nor 
Fauzi Bowo wanted to submit themselves to the pressure from the coalition of marginalized groups 
(consisting of Rakyat Miskin Kota, Persatuan Penyandang Cacat se-DKI, and Forum Waria Indonesia). 
The groups issued motions of no confidence against both candidates for their failure to sign a 
memorandum of understanding that pledged their commitment to rakyat. See "Debat Kumis Fauzi," Berita 
Kota, August 5, 2007, pp. 1,11
